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Introduction
After decades in which companies used to host their entire IT infrastructures in-house, a major shift is occurring where these infrastructures are outsourced to external operators such as data centres and clouds [1] . Clouds by definition are a large pool of easily usable and accessible virtualized resources (such as hardware, development platforms, storage and services). These resources can be dynamically re-configured to adjust to a variable load, allowing for optimum resource utilization. A pay-per-use model is typically adopted to exploit this pool of resources with guarantees of availability by the cloud service providers (SPs). -how their data, applications and infrastructures are stored and managed by others in remote locations; -how their proprietary data are protected if they are stored with the data of other tenants (some of whom may even be competitors) on shared infrastructure (at least in the public cloud); -the nature and extent of control they will have over their data in the cloud in view of the dynamic nature of resource provisioning [6] ; -their relationship with third parties to whom the cloud providers often subcontract and outsource the provisioning of their services and who in most cases may be unknown to the end users, as well as reside in locations unknown to them [7] ; -the effect of data and databases being easily reproduced on virtual machines (VMs) running in the cloud; -how to reconcile the intellectual property rights that may accrue from the use of cloud computing technology that can potentially generate new information derived from the data made available from users (either individuals or companies); and -how to deal with security breaches and transfer of data to third countries without adequate level of data protection, and where data are vulnerable to access by state agents.
Risk is defined as 'Hazard, danger, exposure to mischance or peril' [8] . In the present context, risk corresponds to hazardous events that have a negative impact on SLA fulfilment. In a cloud environment, providers aim to assess and manage the risk associated with offering an SLA to an end user. Hence, the hazardous events from this perspective are any events that potentially adversely affect the provider's ability to ensure that the SLA is fulfilled. The risk associated with such events can be characterized using two key parameters: the probability of occurrence and the impact of occurrence. Consider the example of unauthorized access to end users' personal data. In order to evaluate the risk of such an event, the provider must take into account the possible causes of such an event and their likelihood of occurring. For example, unauthorized access to personal data could be caused by hacking, malware, malicious activities or even human error. Each of these causes must be accounted in order to enable an assessment of risk. All such events and their impact need to be considered in order to compute an overall probability of SLA violation.
Regarding the impact of an SLA failure on an end user, this is dependent on the application domain and requires a legal framework for a detailed analysis. Figure 1 describes the risk assessment steps. Note that risk assessment takes place at: (i) the service deployment stage for initial placement of services on cloud providers, possibly taking the legal factor as a criterion for cloud providers' selection and (ii) the service operation, where cloud resources and data are managed by the cloud provider to fulfil the service-level objectives, including the legal ones. During deployment and operation stages, risk needs to be constantly monitored in order to prevent any additional costs being incurred by the end users and cloud providers.
In this article, we firstly analyse data retention policies and the minimum security standards. Secondly, we describe the steps towards the design of a legal risk inventory and its implementation in clouds.
Legal risks
Legal risk in the IT industry continues to be an active area of research [9, 10] and covers many aspects of law, including copyright protection, privacy and censorship. However, our core interest lies in the risks associated with managing data, specifically the following.
-Data protection and data security. A key inhibitor of the cloud, where trust and control of the data is critical to building confidence. -Intellectual property rights. Includes the question 'Who owns the data in the cloud? ' Cloud computing creates new data using various tools (data mining etc.). The concept of ownership implies the owner can control how the data will be regulated. In the following subsections, we discuss these legal aspects in the context of cloud computing. We group them into two different perspectives, the end user and the cloud provider, as a result of their effects on each party. Legal issues are present during all stages of the service life cycle of a cloud service (figure 2). In the initial contractual agreement that the end user makes with a cloud provider, the end user may not be able to negotiate specific legal clauses that will satisfy certain service requirements on how data are to be protected as a result of the standard nature of the contracts. Although big establishments may be able to specify data protection clauses, small and medium enterprises may not be able to do so [11] . Nevertheless, these contracts are legally binding, which must be fulfilled by the cloud provider. The cloud provider must ensure that all clauses will be adhered to before deploying the service because any breach represents a legal risk. Therefore, constant monitoring of legal risks will be required during the operation phase.
(a) End-user perspective and against all other unlawful forms of processing'. In cloud scenarios, the controller may task the cloud provider (who may be seen as the data processor) with choosing the methods and the technical or organizational measures to be used to achieve the purposes of the controller. This delegation does not however take away the responsibilities placed on the end user as the controller. This poses a risk that the end user will be in breach of the law where the cloud provider fails to implement these measures [6] . Before we look at the impact of this risk, we will examine these concepts as well as other risk factors from a legal point of view.
(i) Destruction of data
Personal data must be protected against accidental or unlawful destruction to ensure integrity and availability as well as business continuity. Destruction of personal data represents the complete removal or serious corruption of physical data (i.e. on the hard disk or in main memory) in the way that their recovery is impossible.
The provision aims to ensure the physical and logical integrity and availability (ensuring business continuity) of the data processed. Cloud providers in general such as Amazon make use of VMs that process the data on physical hardware in data centres. Compared with physical servers, data inside VMs are more volatile than data in traditional IT environments. If VMs crash or are shut down, the data are usually lost. Furthermore, if VM images or instances are stored on a physical server directly attached to the server itself, all hosted VMs totally depend on the physical machine they are running on. In the worst case, all data processed in a VM running on the server could be destroyed when the physical machine crashes or is destroyed, regardless of whether caused by disasters or malevolent acts by unauthorized persons. This is an important issue in cloud computing, as more business-critical workloads are deployed in VMs. A catastrophic failure of a single physical server might therefore result in an interruption of a large number of services [13] .
Because cloud offerings are providing their services using VMs, the data may be put at risk because of the fact that VMs containing personal data can easily be erased. Furthermore, there is the danger of physical machines being a single point of failure for hosted VMs. When the physical machine is destroyed, all VMs running on this machine will be affected. On the other hand, the relatively simple and inexpensive replication of VMs in multiple locations increases overall capacity and availability.
(
ii) Loss
The Data Protection Directive [12] aims to protect the logical and physical availability of personal data by requiring the EU Member States to implement security measures against unplanned events (natural disasters, hardware failures). This element protects the physical and logical availability of the data. It emphasizes the obligation to implement safeguards to prevent data from being unavailable owing to unplanned events such as power interruption, natural disasters or spontaneous hardware failures. Keeping data in backup is a form of this safeguard. The provision seeks to ensure that data are made as available as possible since recovery measures might be costly and time consuming. However, as already mentioned, cloud computing benefits from increased redundancy and independence from failure as it stores data dynamically in different locations [5] . Also, stored VMs will be available in much shorter time than physical servers. By taking measures against destruction of personal data, the requirement to prevent data loss is as good as fulfilled at the same time. One other possible technical measure to achieve this aim could be to implement data loss (leak) prevention concepts in clouds.
(iii) Alteration
Another security measure to be taken to ensure the integrity of personal data is to protect them against unauthorized alteration. To protect data against alteration, an IT system has to ensure that data may not be modified undetectably or adapted by unauthorized persons. This requires functions for input control in order to retrace who accessed which data, and the time and purpose of access [14] . The input control aims mainly to identify and retrace errors in the data processing, but it is also a tool to monitor unauthorized access and the integrity of the data processed in the IT system.
Alteration means any modification applied to existing data that results in a difference compared with the time before the modification came into effect. Our analysis has shown that national data security obligations require controllers or processors to log whether data have been entered into the system, with date and time and by whom this has been done. This is of relevance for audits, i.e. for certification, but also with regard to possible security incidents or unlawful input or modification of data into the information processing system. The obligation to create logs will mainly affect the application (software as a service, SaaS) layer. The information given above should provide a sufficient overview to trace to what extent data have been altered.
The retention period of audit logs should depend on the nature and quantity of data concerned. Where special categories of data (Art. 8 of the Data Protection Directive) and/or large sets of personal data are concerned, the log file should be stored for a longer period even after the final removal of the original data, while log file information about non-sensitive and/or small sets of personal data may be deleted earlier. Log files are very important from a legal point of view for evidentiary purposes and should be kept separately and subject to the same security measures as the original data. This is necessary because where the log files are kept insecure, they could be corrupted and also serve as a security threat. Their contents should be structured in a way that it is possible to segment them in order to make them available to customers and legal authorities.
(iv) Disclosure
A very important data security requirement is that data have to be protected against unauthorized disclosure. Disclosure is the act of making something known that was previously secret or private. This element is one of the cornerstones of the data security framework. In fact, it is an important element in the hands of the data subjects to preserve their right to personal data protection. It prevents both the controller and processor (the end user and cloud provider, respectively) from disclosing data to third parties. Thus, this element of the provision strives to preserve the confidentiality of data in a technical way. Especially in cloud computing environments, the aspect of confidentiality is of utmost importance. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, cloud computing supports multi-tenancy [5] . Different service consumers or customers might be working on the same physical machine, only separated by a software abstraction layer. Therefore, personal data processed in a VM must strictly be separated from the data inside another VM so that the data cannot be disclosed to another tenant working on the same physical machine. For that reason, clouds should ensure that at all times, data inside a VM are kept separately from other VMs that are not assigned to the same client. Secondly, data can be frequently distributed within the clouds using a VM management component. Such a component would be responsible for efficient management of VMs running in a cloud infrastructure. The task of the component is to optimize how the VMs are placed on the physical resources so that the provider's internal goals are maximized. Distributing the workload is inherent in all matured cloud architectures, such as the Amazon Web Services with Elastic Load Balancing (http://aws.amazon.com/elasticloadbalancing/?preview=true). Data are dynamically allocated according to a large number of different factors. This leads to continuous data streams between different locations (data centres) of different providers, in order to find the optimal location for maximum performance and to keep the agreed service levels. Consequently, this may lead to the risk that unauthorized persons in clouds may be intercepting data. This risk is higher than in the traditional infrastructure, as more data are in transit [5] . The Directive has explicitly addressed this risk in Art. 17 of the Directive [12] . It states that data need to be protected against unauthorized disclosure, 'in particular where the processing involves the transmission of data over a network'. This provision is therefore of high relevance, as cloud computing involves the transmission of large amounts of data 'in the cloud', which is basically a network of data centres sharing and distributing resources and should strive to guarantee safe and uninterrupted data transfer. 
(v) Access
Another protective measure is to prevent unauthorized access to personal data. This element refers to the requirement of restricted permission to access data and process them. Its aim is therefore to implement measures for access control and it guarantees the confidentiality of the data. Access control can be defined as a procedure used to determine whether an entity should be granted access to resources, facilities, services or information based on pre-established rules and specific rights or authority associated with the requesting party [15] . Access control is very important, since only the data controller and/or the processors should be authorized to access the data. In addition, within the organization of a cloud provider, access rights should be carefully assigned to particular persons only. Finally, on the SaaS level, cloud services/applications should provide service consumers with the ability to assign access rights and restrictions for their own organization, in order to avoid unauthorized access to personal data.
In cloud computing, identity and access management (IdAM) are important keywords. Identity management can be defined as a set of functions and capabilities used for the assurance of identity information, assurance of the identity of an entity and supporting business and security applications.
(vi) Transfer and retention of data
Apart from the measures emanating from Art. 17 of the Directive as discussed above, there are also the risks that personal data may be transferred and stored outside the EU or EEA countries. In this regard, the European Commission has decided that several countries ensure an adequate level of protection (e.g. Switzerland and the USA, provided the data importer is registered under the 'Safe Harbour' framework) and to which data may be transferred without additional requirements. Any other transfer of personal data in the cloud to third countries is generally prohibited if there are no further legal safeguards. Data retention post-termination of the SLA is another risk for customers. According to the Data Protection Directive [12] , the data may only be processed for adequate and relevant purposes, and not kept for longer than is necessary for the purposes for which they were collected. Upon termination of the SLA, the purpose ceases to exist; hence the data must be erased. There may also be cases where a cloud provider terminates the SLA without notice to the end user, resulting in a risk of the end user losing access to all data.
(b) Cloud provider perspective (i) Ownership of data
Data ownership refers to both the possession of and responsibility for information, which implies control over that information. Such control involves the capability to access, create, modify, package, derive from, sell or remove data, as well as the right to assign these rights. Data have an intrinsic as well as an added value. This is usually something produced in the process of making something else. 'At the core, the degree of ownership (and by corollary, the degree of responsibility) is driven by the value that each interested party derives from the use of that information' [16] .
In an environment where there is shared control of data (such as cloud computing), there should be a complete understanding of the different matters related to data ownership in order to know who is entitled to a claim arising from such data. Accordingly, Gartner submitted a list of rights and responsibilities with regard to cloud computing, expressly mentioning the right to retain ownership, the right for use and control of one's own data [17] .
Data ownership does not have any practical value if one is not able to access one's own data. For instance, if an end user wants to migrate data away from the cloud provider, it is important to ensure the contract allows for access to 'back-end data'. While subscribing to a cloud service usually allows end users to get access to the functionality of the application that they use, it is equally important to ensure that they can still access the data if such access is removed. Agreements between end users and providers should offer export data capabilities, either directly or via the provider, even after the termination of the contract [18] .
Therefore, loss of ownership rights will not only reduce or even compromise shareholder value in a business setting, but also may put at risk the organization's ability to migrate to another provider. The opportunity and ability to switch cloud providers is relevant for the competition of enterprises in the market. Avoiding 'lock in' and enabling switching between providers will encourage better service levels at lower costs, thus fostering competition in the market [19] . It is of utmost importance to ensure that end users 'own their data' that they make available to the cloud provider. One way to achieve this is to mention and clarify all ownership rights in any formal agreement such as an SLA.
(ii) Other unlawful forms of processing Data must be protected against all other unlawful forms of processing. Although this legal term is vague, it however encompasses a very broad concept because it is not easy in most cases to determine specific security measures in order to comply with legal stipulations. In our view, the provision aims to ensure that data processing systems are designed in such a way that they ensure that data processing operations meet the obligations under the law. In short, this element tries to establish a data security obligation within the provisions of the Data Protection Directive [12] . This translates to building the so-called 'privacy-enhancing technologies' (PET) which are specifically designed for protecting privacy [20] . PET stands for a coherent system of information and communication technology measures that protects privacy by eliminating or reducing personal data or by preventing unnecessary and/or undesired processing of personal data, and at the same time, not losing the functionality of the information system. For instance, one measure could be the automatic anonymization of data after a certain lapse of time or encryption tools.
The data controller is only obliged to implement appropriate measures. The objective of this element is to eliminate or minimize the impact that different security-related threats and vulnerabilities might have on an organization's data processing [21] . The Directive is not clear with regard to the level of security to be implemented by cloud providers. Security measures must therefore be appropriate with regard to the anticipated risks inherent in the data processing, as well as with regard to the nature of data and the costs of their implementation [20] . Sensitive data as mentioned in Art. 8 (1) of the Data Protection Directive [12] may require even more sophisticated security measures, while other data may require less strict measures. As the applications of security frameworks within cloud structures have a significant impact on performance, data management and costs, we recommend cloud providers to provide measures allowing service consumers to separate personal data from other data. This way, data not falling under the Data Protection Directive's scope can be processed more efficiently without the boundaries marked by data protection law.
Assessing appropriate security measures for cloud computing is not an easy task. In general, we have already highlighted that one of the specific cloud computing risks involves massive transfer of data. ENISA rates the risk of data being intercepted in transit as 'high' [5] . The ongoing debate about data protection and data security in clouds shows that there are major concerns in adopting cloud computing. Out of these considerations, we find that the overall risk of using cloud computing is higher compared with traditional IT. Consequently, to cope with these increased risks, appropriate measures with regard to cloud computing require higher security efforts. However, these measures always have to be adjusted to individual cases. While some cloud services host customer information of very low sensitivity, others represent mission-critical business functions [22] . Where cloud computing involves the use of special categories of data (particularly sensitive data) according to Art. 8 of the Data Protection Directive (e.g. health data), they must be even more strictly secured. However, this does not mean that every theoretically 
Towards a risk inventory (a) Design
When dealing with legal risks, one has to consider the actors involved when creating the risk inventory as introduced earlier: the end users and the cloud providers. These actors can acquire different roles in the area of data protection law-either data controller or processor. Since only the controller is legally responsible for the processing, as a matter of course, the risk is higher than that connected with being a processor and processing data only on behalf of the controller. This has to be taken into account when creating the risk inventory, which will be populated with the following.
-Assets. What to protect, e.g. data and their characteristics. Risk events will be assessed in terms of these. -Incidents/risk scenarios. To describe any event, condition or their combination that has the potential to reduce the capacity or availability of an asset. These are composed of vulnerabilities and threats. Adaptive capacity on the other hand is the description of the mitigating strategies in place for the specific asset. -Impact/consequences. Of a risk incident are defined using as degraded performance, loss, destruction, alteration, disclosure of data, service unavailability, etc.
Various research areas have developed risk inventories for determining how certain risks can be managed and evaluated to be brought up to an acceptable level [23] . Most of the steps towards creating the risk inventory vary across the different disciplines and context they are going to be used in. In terms of cloud computing, a set of processes are identified to create and manage a risk inventory for the implementation of the framework.
(1) Determine which use case scenario to focus on: private cloud, federated cloud, multi-cloud. (2) Determine the areas of interaction in the cloud. Interaction takes place at various levels such as end user/cloud provider or within the cloud provider between the service deployment and operation phases. During each of these levels, an SLA is agreed between parties and its fulfilment monitored. (3) Identify the assets involved, which have to be protected from external and internal dangers, as well as the vulnerabilities and threats these assets may have during operation. (4) Identify the risk-triggering factors for these assets. (ii) Relationship between vulnerabilities, threat and risk. Threats (T) represent the other side of risk, which depend on external factors that are independent of the asset. As vulnerabilities reflect the possibility of a risk, these can be related to the threatening factors being present. This leads to a risk (R).
. . , n and k = 1, . . . , 0.
(iii) Relationship between risk and events. Each risk can propagate a number of events (E) to take place, which can in turn lead to further risks. Each risk consists of a risk category (RC) and an RL. An RL comprises the impact of the risk and its likelihood. The impact is defined as the evaluation according to the indicators selected to describe the asset. The impact and likelihood can be categorized as-very low, low, medium, high or very high. These determine the level of the risk by multiplying the risk impact and risk likelihood.
(iv) Relationship between risks and their mitigations. Mitigation strategies depend on the asset, the event and any additional environmental factors (X).
Different cloud scenarios can allow different assets to be at threat, depending on the service running on the providers. These threats can be of various kinds, generated by the different interacting components such as the data, SLA or security management. Following is a list of legal threat scenarios associated with the different managers which cause them. In terms of legal risk assessment, SLAs between end user and cloud provider are the assets to be protected. This asset can then have a number of vulnerabilities that can cause a breach on the contract. These threats are discussed in detail below.
-Threat: data transfer to other countries; causing agent: data manager This threat can be monitored using all the current processing operations in the data manager, particularly with regard to the location of processing. It can be ensured that there is no externalization of resources to data centres in countries without an adequate level of protection only when additional legal safeguards are in place (e.g. standard contractual clauses).
-Threat: SLA violations; causing agent: SLA manager This threat can be monitored by using all the current processing operations on the data. All processing should follow instructions from controllers and any further subcontracting with other processors must require consent with the cloud end user.
-Threat: data protection and security issues; causing agent: security framework manager
The data manager must ensure that personal data are protected against accidental or unlawful destruction. It can create logs concerning any alteration made to the data. Personal data must be protected against unauthorized disclosure in order to guarantee the safe and uninterrupted transfer of data by using encryption. This can be protected by implementing an IdAM. The cloud security framework should be based on a recognized information security-related standard such as ISO/IEC 27001:2005. Table 1 provides example entries in a risk inventory, which defines the attribute asset values (AVs) and associated vulnerabilities and threats. These values can be set by the experts who are involved in managing the cloud. The risk inventory documents all the risks to the assets and their related vulnerabilities and threats. Starting with the assets, vulnerabilities and threats with their probabilities can be documented in advance. Vulnerability exploitability (VE) represents to what degree the vulnerability can be exploited and its affect on the impact level of the risk (IL), i.e. IL = Level(AV × VE). Vulnerability severity represents the degree that the vulnerability exhibits and contributes to the final risk. As stated in table 1, expert opinions are used to decide the value of certain attributes of each entry of the inventory. It is worth noting that in many cases, the elimination of biases and conflicting opinions of experts are challenging general issues. Among many methods for addressing this challenge, combination of expert assessment distributions (e.g. Bayesian-based) and performance-based weighting with the aim of achieving rational consensus are the typical ones [24] . In the case of assessment of attributes of legal risks, the performance-based weighting approach is favoured, as it is practical to obtain a consensus among a team of legal experts, with different legitimate perspectives (e.g. on behalf of the cloud end user or the cloud provider), under the help of negotiations. Section 5 discusses the implementation details of how the risk inventory will work as part of the cloud infrastructure. The risk inventory works as an automated process that can be easily used by the providers to check the RLs of the associated architectures and service and not applicable at the end-user level.
The risk inventory will work in conjunction with a rule-based risk model to assess some of the risks during processing. The rule-based risk model will allow threats to be detected and match them to the assets under protection and associated risk levels, which are defined in the risk inventory. For example, the threat of data moving to a not trusted zone can be detected by constantly monitoring the log files that document every time the data are processed or moved. While traversing the files, the rule-based model will repeatedly fire the following rule:
Check risk inventory where 'Asset==Data', Output 'Impact Level of Risk'
This level of risk can be communicated to the controllers, which can then make a decision on which risk mitigation strategy should be employed, whether to accept the risk, if the impact level is down, or shut down certain processes, if the impact level is too high. stakeholders in both scenarios are both the end user and the cloud provider. Some legal threats in both scenarios are discussed next. The CORAS tool [25] , an open-source risk-modelling tool, is used to illustrate risk. In a multi-cloud scenario, the service is deployed to run on multiple providers. Using multiple providers gives access to additional resources at the service operation, and allows the choice of the most appropriate providers depending on the functional and non-functional requirements of the SLA. The legal risk described in figure 3 depicts the threat of data being transferred to a provider in an unknown location. The asset is thus the data to be protected and the stakeholder affected by such a threat is the cloud provider that had deployed the service. Therefore, this threat needs to be monitored by traversing the logs that record where the data are moved during the cloud life cycle.
In a federation of clouds, a service can be deployed into a set of providers working in collaboration to meet the service requirements. This use case differs from the multi-cloud use case as the providers have previously entered into a mutual agreement between all members of the federation before coming into contact with the deployed service. The threat described in figure 4 depicts what happens if one of the providers in the federation running the service is in an unknown location. This provider is called the 'IP' in the figure. In clouds in most cases, the end user can specify that the providers used should not be located in particular countries. In such a case, data deployed to that particular provider can lead to a violation in the SLA. Therefore, the asset here is the SLA and the stakeholder affected is the end user. 
Implementation and evaluation
The OPTIMIS (Optimized Infrastructure Services) project [3] is an EC funded R&D project that aims to enable an open and dependable cloud service ecosystem (CSE) that delivers IT services that are adaptable, reliable, auditable and sustainable both ecologically and economically. The OPTIMIS project is delivering an open specification and a software toolkit that supports the construction of the multiple coexisting architectures that make up the next-generation CSE. The OPTIMIS Base Toolkit provides functionalities common to components that are used during cloud service deployment and operation phases. These include TREC (Trust, Risk, Eco-efficiency and Cost) assessment tools, cloud monitoring infrastructure, capabilities for secure interconnection of multiple clouds as well as end-to-end security. The TREC factors are harmonized to support the optimization decision-making by high-level components such as the Virtual Machine Manager and the Data Manager. In OPTIMIS, two stakeholders are considered: the SP responsible for the deployment of the service on behalf of the end user, and the infrastructure provider (IP) responsible for running the service.
As a knowledge base for risk assessment, the risk inventory designed in §4 is being integrated with a rule-based risk modelling component as part of the risk assessment software tool (figure 5). The risk assessment tool is a self-contained independent functional module that is able to perform as a 'plug-in' for other high-level cloud management and control tools, specifically for service optimization at deployment and operation stages. In the context of OPTIMIS, the risk assessment tool is implemented as two independent components: the Service Provider Risk Assessment Tool (SPRAT) and the Infrastructure Provider Risk Assessment Tool (IPRAT) for the service deployment and operation phases, respectively. Regarding the service construction phase, the end user of a cloud service can specify the legal aspect-related requirements in the SLA via the cloud programming integrated development environment provided by the OPTIMIS toolkit.
(a) Service deployment Figure 6 depicts the various factors that can additionally input into the risk inventory for assessing certain events. This would take place particularly on the deployment phase where the risk assessment is based on the data that are communicated across about the profile of the provider in use. This can either be historical data based on the past or the current monitored events. To assess the profile of a provider, the figure depicts the seven criteria extracted from Jansen & Grance [26] Hierarchy Process) algorithm [27] to help build a sorted list of the best to worst providers from the risk point of view. This list then helps one to choose the most reliable provider to deploy the service on.
For the SPRAT, its high-level functions (e.g. evaluate the reliability of a specific IP offer) are mainly exposed by its external interfaces defined in its subcomponents. The risk inventory is designed as a knowledge base to consist of facts, scenarios and reasoning rules for risk-assessment-related decision-making activities.
(b) Service operation
During the operation phase, the risk inventory would take inputs from the monitoring environment as depicted in figure 7 . At this stage, the service is tied to the SLA previously agreed between the SP and the IP. The SLA thus needs to be constantly monitored to ensure it does not get violated during the time the service is in operation.
For the IPRAT, its high-level functions (e.g. evaluate the legal risk prior to data transfer) are mainly exposed by its external interfaces. The risk inventory is designed as a knowledge base to consist of facts, scenarios and reasoning rules that are related to lower level hardware and software resources.
The risk assessment tools will be evaluated in the OPTIMIS test bed thanks to the interactions with other OPTIMIS toolkit components under different use-case scenarios as presented in §4. The accuracy of the risk assessment can then be judged by the effectiveness of the optimization conducted by the high-level components that depend on the assessments by the risk and other TREC factor tools collectively.
Related work
In this section, some related work on cloud/grid computing middleware and legal risk/security assessments is reviewed. Although the research work presented in this article so far focuses on the legal aspects of data ownership and protection in clouds, it is worth noting other related aspects such as the assessment of cloud end-user privacy protection and confidentiality under different legal systems [28] . Djemame et al. [29] have considered specific aspects of SLAs and developed grid architectural support for building risk-aware brokering components. Claessens [30] aims to deliver a datacentric information protection framework based on data-sharing agreements in open computing environments. The framework enables dynamic management policies based on agreements that ensure end-to-end secure protection of data-centric information incorporating models and implementation of risk and context-aware policy refinement mechanisms. A formal goaloriented risk framework is proposed for modelling, assessing and treating risk on the basis of the likelihood and severity of failures in critical systems. Balducelli et al. [31] aim to increase dependability, survivability and resilience of information-based infrastructures such as communication technologies and pervasive systems. The work proposes a middleware that facilitates secure IT-based communication between different infrastructure providers. By supporting recovery actions and increasing service stability in the case of critical situations through scenario and risk analysis, this middleware substantially enhances the security of large complex mission-critical infrastructures.
Most of the above work focuses on either risks related to grids or risks related to aspects of data security in general computing. They do not consider risk assessment in cloud computing or more specifically the legal risks associated with using cloud infrastructures. However, they do shed light on risk assessment from both end-user and server/provider perspectives and provide potential use cases for the work presented in this article.
In many cases, the concerns of privacy and confidentiality are related to the ownership of data generated and stored on a cloud provider. For example, when an application is deployed into the cloud, it generates indirect real-time data that can be used to build statistics on an application's user access behaviour pattern. The ownership of these data effects privacy and confidentiality from the point of view of the end user. As investigated by Gellman [32] , 'A user's privacy and confidentiality risks vary significantly with the terms of service and privacy policy established by the cloud provider. Those risks may be magnified when the cloud provider has reserved the right to change its terms and policies at will'. This conclusion is in line with our vision of conducting risk assessment from the perspectives of both cloud users and cloud providers. In addition, the report discusses outsourcing, in which, owing to the elastic and ubiquitous nature of cloud service provision, it is normal practice for a cloud provider to contract out part of its user data and usages onto another provider. Under this circumstance, we identify the need for delegating related legal risk assessment. In the work by Ruiter & Warnier [33] , uncertainties with respect to privacy regulations in cloud computing are investigated and discussed. It concludes that even when the cloud provider is compliant with the privacy regulations, the end user still needs to ensure they adhere to the legislation set in the regulations themselves. More awareness among cloud users may eventually lead to an increase in the number of compliant cloud providers; on the other hand, it also highlights the juridical impact on privacy within cloud computing.
Conclusions
The use of SLAs to govern interactions in cloud computing between end users and cloud providers is gaining momentum. However, such agreements may represent a legal risk to the parties involved.
End users who wish to procure critical cloud computing services may need to challenge the cloud provider positions present in the SLA. In turn, cloud providers will need to appreciate end users' need to obtain both technical and legal assurances. In such a scenario, only a fully negotiated SLA can provide both parties with a satisfactory allocation of risk.
Cloud computing necessarily implies data transfer and, possibly, a trans-border data flow. From this perspective, the legal qualification of the subjects involved with the data flow and the definition of the consequent responsibilities and obligations are fundamental. Therefore, this article has addressed an important issue in relation to risk assessment in cloud computing. It has presented an analysis of risk from the legal perspective, focusing on data protection and security, as well the requirements of an inherent risk inventory. An external third party that needs to monitor the transactions between the end users and cloud providers is foreseen to enforce the legal agreement identified between both parties.
The implementation of such a risk inventory is currently underway [3] 
